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Abstract
This study conducts both theoretical and empirical analyses of how non-legally-binding
COVID-19 policies affect people’s going-out behavior. The theoretical analysis assumes that
under a declared state of emergency, the individual going out suffers psychological costs arising
from both the risk of infection and the stigma of going out. Our hypothesis states that under
a declared state of emergency people refrain from going out because it entails a strong psycho-
logical cost. Then, this study estimates a model using regional mobility data and emergency
declarations data to analyze self-restraint behavior under a non-legally binding emergency dec-
laration. The results show that, compared with before the declaration of the state of emergency,
going-out behavior was suppressed under the state of emergency and after it was lifted even
when going out did not result in penalties, which is consistent with the theoretical analysis.
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1 Introduction
The coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) has become a global pandemic that has infected more
than 21 million people worldwide as of August 16, 2020 (WHO, 2020). To reduce its spread,
countries around the world have adopted a variety of policies. In particular, strong policy measures
to reduce infection have been implemented to restrict people’s activities, especially their ability to go
out, in an effort to reduce their chances of contact. Other policies have also been applied globally
to protect people, such as social distancing, stay home, school closure, and protection measures
at ports and airports. Yoo and Managi (2020) argue that such policies against COVID-19 will
save lives and consequently minimize economic losses. Furthermore, Nakamura and Managi (2020)
show that reducing air travel decreases the risk of the import and export of goods. Policies that
restrict behavior with the aim of preventing the spread of infectious diseases can be categorized into
two types: enforceable behavioral restrictions that consider penalties using the legal system, and
behavioral restrictions that do not use the legal system and are left to people’s sense of self-restraint
(unenforceable).
Examples of the former are the behavioral limitations imposed by the policies of several European
countries where the COVID-19 infection had spread rapidly. Under the Health Emergency Bill
approved by lawmakers on March 22, 2020, France imposes fines of between 135 and 3,700 Euros on
people going out for purposes other than those authorized by the government such as the purchase of
daily necessities. In Italy, which has the world’s sixth highest number of COVID-19-related deaths
at 35,392 (as of August 16, 2020), a decree ordered a nationwide curfew on March 10, 2020, with
fines of up to 3,000 Euros for those who do not carry a “certificate” stating where they are going
and why. As of August 16, 2020, the United States has the highest number of cases in the world.
With the highest number of cases in the country, New York State issued a governor’s decree on
March 22, 2020, requiring 100% telecommuting. The decree imposes fines of up to 10,000 dollars if
a company fails to comply and causes serious physical harm to its employees.
In contrast to these strict measures against the spread of infectious diseases that prohibit cit-
izens from going out where the state imposes severe private rights restrictions with penalties for
violations, the legal basis for restricting behavior in several other countries is vague. This refers to
the second type of policy described above—a policy of curtailment based on people’s self-restraint,
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without enforcement. Aiming to attain a certain number of infections and immunization without
strict restrictive measures, Sweden recommends working from home and only advocates avoiding
unnecessary travel and social contact with high-risk older people. Japan, which has the lowest
number of cases per million people among the 36 industrialized countries in the OECD, has a non-
coercive, unenforceable policy with a vague legal basis, such as declaring a state of emergency and
requesting that people refrain from leaving home unnecessarily to control the spread of COVID-19.
Japan’s policy resulted in a reduction in going-out behavior after the declaration of the state
of emergency (The Japan Times, 2020a; Kyodo News, 2020). Thus , the number of infections
is considered to have been controlled more successfully than in other OECD countries (Lu et al.,
2020; Iwasaki and Grubaugh, 2020). However, although these reports of reduced going-out behavior
compare such behavior before and after the emergency declaration, they only focus on densely
populated central metropolitan areas and do not control for public awareness of the increase in
the number of infections and the behavior reflected by it. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude
from these reports whether the declaration of emergency actually reduced the amount of going-out
behavior across the country, that is, the entire area within which the request for self-restraint was
made.
In fact, the effect of these requests for self-restraint on the public’s consciousness in Japan is re-
flected in the “self-restraint police” (Jishuku Keisatsu in Japanese) phenomenon. The self-restraint
police are said to be members of the general public who conduct private policing of individuals
and groups who do not comply with requests to refrain from going out or other activities under
the emergency declaration. There have been incidents involving these self-restraint police, such as
harassing phone calls, posts about restaurants that were operating under the declared state of emer-
gency (The Japan Times, 2020c), slander of travelers because of their history of having COVID-19
(The Japan Times, 2020b), and damage to travelers’ cars at tourist sites when the license plate
numbers indicated that the cars were from another prefecture (The Japan Times, 2020b).
It is likely that this phenomenon occurred because people have an aversion to those who do
not refrain from going out, even in the case of the non-legally binding declaration of a state of
emergency. Thus, we suggest that even under unenforceable policies, people may refrain from going
out to avoid the social stigma. Accordingly, this study focuses on restrictions that inhibit people
from going out under a decree that has an ambiguous legal basis, from both the theoretical and
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empirical perspectives.
Specifically, for the theoretical analysis, we introduce a theoretical model that analyzes self-
restraint behavior in the context of spreading infectious diseases from the stigmatization perspective.
First, statements such as the Japanese government’s state of emergency are not legally binding.
Thus, there are no fines or penalties for individuals who go out. Nevertheless, most Japanese citizens
refrained from going outside under the state of emergency. A plausible reason for the declaration’s
success is that most people were afraid of the risk of infection at that time. For example, Aum et al.
(2020) assume that people accept the disutility of going out because of the risk of infection and
conclude that people will stay home if they are at high risk of infection. If this is the only reason,
then the effect of restraint should be consistent when the risk of infection is constant under the
state of emergency and after it is lifted. Could this be true? What other important factors must
be considered that affect people’s self-restraint behavior? To address these questions, we analyze
people’s self-restraint behavior by introducing stigma into our theoretical model, as well as the risk
of infection.
The research on stigma has developed around social psychology Major et al. (2018), starting with
the discussion by Goffman (1963). There are also several studies on stigma in economics; Moffitt
(1983); Besley and Coate (1992); Bhargava and Manoli (2015) study the stigma of accepting welfare
benefits (Lindbeck et al., 1999; Kurita et al., Forthcoming; Itaya and Kurita, 2020). Moreover, Kim
(2003) analyzes the stigma related to tax evasion, and Rasmusen (1996) investigates the stigma
against an ex-convict.
Stigma is important in analyzing the going-out behavior during the spread of infectious diseases
because it can play a complementary role to infection risk in people’s self-restraint behavior. In
Japan, under the state of emergency, it was a social norm to refrain from going out. Public opinion
was that going out under the state of emergency was anti-social behavior. In other words, people
who go out under the state of emergency are stigmatized by society as having inferior ethics because
they do not follow the social norms.
The theoretical analysis in this study assumes that, under the declared state of emergency, the
individual going out suffers psychological costs arising from both the stigma of going out and the
risk of infection. That is, we emphasize that infection risk and stigma have a complementary effect
on the psychological cost to the player. Thus, the theoretical result shows that under a declared
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state of emergency, people refrain more from going out as it entails a strong psychological cost.
For the empirical perspectives, several studies analyze the effect of Japan’s non-legally en-
forceable emergency declarations on the population. For example, Kobayashi et al. (2020) use a
state-space model that combines susceptible-infected-recovered models to predict the evolution of
infectious diseases and includes the magnitude and timing of the peak of the epidemic, following
the emergency declaration in Japan. They confirm that the issuance and extension of the state of
emergency declaration has, to some extent, been successful in controlling the COVID-19 pandemic
Based on a survey of areas where the spread of COVID-19 infection was significant, Yamamoto et al.
(2020) show that actions of self-restraint based on the declaration of a state of emergency cause
psychological distress. Kawaguchi et al. (2020) use data from small and medium-sized Japanese
enterprises to find that, in the short term, the state of emergency reduces both feasible and ex-
pected sales Qian and Yahara (2020) conduct a survey under the state of emergency and find that
accuracy, morality, and ideology are changing people’s behavior and mental health in response to
COVID-19. Finally, Yamamura and Tsutsui (2020) analyze individual-level changes in preventive
behavior and mental status due to the emergency declaration.
In contrast to studies analyzing the effect of non-legally binding policies such as those described
above, others analyze the effect of an enforceable lockdown on the economy (Acemoglu et al., 2020;
Alvarez et al., 2020; Farboodi et al., 2020; Holtemo¨ller, 2020; Eichenbaum et al., 2020; Gharehgozli
et al., 2020; Mandel and Veetil, 2020; Martin et al., 2020). Martin et al. (2020) develop a mi-
croeconomic model to assess the socioeconomic effect of COVID-19 on individuals, estimating the
direct effect of the lockdown policy on household income, consumption, and poverty. Acemoglu
et al. (2020) build a heterogeneous susceptible-exposed-infected-recovered model and conclude that
a lockdown policy that focuses on at-risk older groups is optimal. Alvarez et al. (2020) discuss the
optimal lockdown policy to minimize the deaths and economic costs attributable to COVID-19,
using the formulation as an optimization problem. Mandel and Veetil (2020) estimate the costs
of a lockdown due to COVID-19 in some sectors of the global economy using a multi-sector dise-
quilibrium model that considers the buyer–seller relationship between agents in different countries.
However, none consider stigma in their scope of research. In addition, lockdowns, unlike emergency
declarations, have a legal basis with penalties. In other words, they do not consider the effects of
looser emergency declarations that are not legally binding.
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Based on the above research, this study contributes in the following ways: First, it develops a
microeconomic theoretical model of people’s going-out behavior in non-legally binding emergency
declarations considering the social stigma against going out. Second, we estimate a macro-panel
data model that combines daily data on various outside behaviors covering all prefectures in Japan
that were collected pre-declaration, under declaration, and post-declaration, as well as covariates to
control for various confounding factors. We thus measure the effect of emergency declarations on
the behavior of people outside the area simultaneously considering factors that contribute to their
behavior and the heterogeneity of emergency declarations in different areas with different dates
of issuance. In addition, we compared the behavior of people who went out after the emergency
declaration was lifted with that before the declaration.
The advantages of our contribution over existing studies on non-legally binding emergency dec-
larations are as follows: First, there is little analysis in the literature on going-out actions associated
with the issuance of emergency declarations based on ambiguous legal systems. Second, we build a
theoretical model to explain going-out behavior under non-legally binding emergency declarations
based on social stigma. Although Yamamura and Tsutsui (2020) analyze people’s going-out behav-
ior under a state of emergency in Japan, because their data set is based on an online questionnaire
survey, there is a possibility of measurement error due to personal memory differences and other
factors. Moreover, because their study used a sample composed of two time points—before and
after the declaration of an emergency—they did not consider changes in going-out activity after the
lifting of the state of emergency. By contrast , this study conducts an empirical analysis consid-
ering the three time points of pre-declaration, under declaration, and post-declaration using data
obtained from Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports, which provide more objective data
than questionnaire survey data.
In the following, we summarize our results. The theoretical analysis showed that the stigmati-
zation of going-out behavior reduces the incentive to go out under the state of emergency compared
with that after it is lifted. In other words, the number of people who go out under the state of
emergency is lower than that after the emergency is lifted. Second, in the empirical analysis, we
examined going-out behavior under a declared state of emergency using daily mobility data for
47 prefectures in Japan. After controlling for confounding factors that may vary by prefecture
and time, we find that going-out behavior is decreased under the state of emergency and after it
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lifted. Furthermore, this study finds that going-out behavior decreased the most during the under
declaration period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the theoretical
analysis. Section 3 discusses the data, econometric methods, and analytical results. Finally, Section
4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
2.1 Setting and Equilibrium
Consider an economy in which the mass of the population is normalized to 1. The player chooses
to go out or not. The player’s payoff is set as follows:


uout − φ [γc+ ισs]
δ if going out,
uhome if staying at home,
(1)
where uout is the utility from going out and uhome is the utility from staying at home. We assume
that the utility from going out is higher than that from staying at home, that is, uout > uhome.
φ [γc+ ισs]δ is the term of the psychological cost. This cost contains the two components of
the risk of infection (γc) and the stigma (ισs). This formulation indicates that the stigma and risk
of infection are complementary in the psychological cost. Here, φ ∈ [0, φ¯] is the sensitivity to the
psychological cost, γ ∈ [0, 1] is the subjective probability of an individual being infected after going
out, c is the cost of infection, s is the stigma cost, σ ∈ (0,+∞) is a parameter that indicates the
relative size of the stigma to the infection in the psychological cost, δ ∈ (0,+∞) is the parameter
of cost to scale, and ι ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator variable that equals one if a state of emergency is
declared and zero otherwise.
We assume that φ has the distribution φ ∼ F (·), where F ′(·) := f(·) and f(φ) > 0 for φ ∈ [0, φ¯].
Then, we consider the critical level of the sensitivity to the stigma cost as follows:
uout − φˆ [γc+ ισs]
δ = uhome. (2)
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From Equation (2), individuals with sensitivities below (above) this threshold have an incentive to
go out (stay home). Solving for φˆ, we obtain the following:
φˆ =
∆
[γc+ ισs]δ
, (3)
where ∆ := uout − uhome > 0.
The proportion of individuals who go out, x, is expressed as follows:
x = Pr(φ ≤ φˆ) = F (φˆ). (4)
We suppose that the stigma cost function is based on conformism as in Lindbeck et al. (1999,
2003). We assume that the stigma cost decreases with the proportion of individuals who go out,
that is, s = s(x), s′(x) < 0, and s ∈ (0,+∞).
We also assume that the difference of utility is higher than the expected cost of infection, that
is, ∆ > γc. When ι = 0, all individuals choose to go out because uout > uhome. By contrast , the
case of ι = 1 is analyzed as follows:


φˆ =
∆
[γc+ ισs]δ
,
x = F
(
φˆ
)
,
s = s(x),
(5)
x = F

 ∆
[γc+ ισs(x)]δ

 := χ(x). (6)
The fixed point of Equation (6), x∗, is the equilibrium of this model1. Clearly, there is at least
one equilibrium from the intermediate value theorem. We present the following proposition:
Proposition 1 There can be multiple equilibria under a state of emergency. Conversely, there is
1The stability condition for the equilibrium is ∂χ/∂x < 1.
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a unique equilibrium when the state of emergency is lifted as follows:
x∗post = F

 ∆
(γc)δ

 (7)
Proof. The slope of Equation (6) is given as follows:
∂χ
∂x
= f

 ∆
[γc+ ισs(x)]δ



 ∆δ
[γc+ ισs(x)]δ+1

 [−ισs′(x)] > 0. (8)
There is the possibility of multiple equilibria under a state of emergency because the sign of Equation
(8) is positive.
By contrast, the sign of Equation (8) is zero when the state of emergency is lifted. To confirm
the equilibrium when the state of emergency is lifted, we substitute ι = 0 into Equation (6) and
obtain the following result:
χ(x)|ι=0 = F

 ∆
(γc)δ

 (9)
Equation (9) is fixed with respect to x. Therefore, the equilibrium when the state of emergency is
lifted (x∗post) is unique and is expressed as follows:
x∗post = F

 ∆
(γc)δ

 (10)
Proposition 1 suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria displayed in Figure 1 as an example.
This figure shows χ(x): χ(x)|ι=1 or χ(x)|ι=0, where χ(x)|ι=1 is χ(x) under a state of emergency
and χ(x)|ι=0 is χ(x) after a state of emergency. There are two equilibria, one with very few people
going-out (x∗under;L) and one with many people going-out (x
∗
under;H), as multiple equilibria under
the state of emergency in Figure 1. We call x∗under;L the “strictly self-restraint equilibrium” and
x∗under;H the “non-strictly self-restraint equilibrium.” The reason for this is the existence of the
complementarity that arises from the presence of externalities between people’s behavior under the
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state of emergency. We can consider that in the Japanese case, under the emergency declaration, an
equilibrium with fewer people going out was achieved—that is, the strictly self-restraint equilibrium,
x∗under;L—and after the emergency declaration, social norms were no longer in effect—that is, the
non-strictly self-restraint equilibrium, x∗post. By contrast, the Florida case could be deemed to fall
under x∗under;H (BBC, 2020; Bloomberg, 2020). In Florida under the declaration of the state of
emergency, we can assume that an equilibrium was achieved in which many people did not choose
to act with restraint.
In the game with multiple equilibria, it is generally not possible to know a priori which equilib-
rium will actually be realized as is well known in economics and game theory. Therefore, it is likely
that we would need to revise non-legally binding policies in favor of more legally binding policies
to achieve a more accurate policy outcome in the fight against COVID-19.
The following proposition presents the results for the difference in the number of citizens going
out between the under the declaration of the state of emergency and after its lifting.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium proportion of players going out under the state of emergency (x∗under)
is less than those going out after it was lifted (x∗post), ceteris paribus.
Proof. Under the state of emergency (ι = 1), by substituting ι = 1 into (6), we obtain the following:
χ (x) |ι=1 = F

 ∆
[γc+ σs(x)]δ

 . (11)
We denote the fixed point of Equation (11) as xunder.
After the state of emergency is lifted, by substituting ι = 0 into (6), we obtain the following:
χ (x) |ι=0 = F

 ∆
(γc)δ

 . (12)
We denote the fixed point of Equation (12) as xpost.
The difference between Equations (11) and (12) is given as follows:
χ (x) |ι=1 − χ (x) |ι=0 < 0. (13)
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𝐹 Δ(𝛾𝑐)𝛿
Figure 1: Example of multiple equilibria
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Therefore, we obtain the following result:
x∗under − x
∗
post < 0 (14)
for any x ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 2 shows that even in the condition with a fixed subjective probability of infection,
the number of people going out under a request for self-restraint based on the declaration of a state
of emergency is lower than those going out after the state of emergency is lifted. This implies that
a non-legally binding policy—the state of emergency—can influence going-out behavior through
stigmatization regardless of the fear of infection. Figure 1 shows that χ(x)|ι=1 is never above the
mapping of χ(x)|ι=0. That is, we confirm the relationship of, x
∗
post > x
∗
under;H > x
∗
under;L.
The following proposition presents an interesting result.
Proposition 3 Under the state of emergency, that is, ι = 1, some players restrain themselves from
going out, even if all players expect the probability of infection to be zero, that is, γ = 0.
Proof. By substituting ι = 1 and γ = 0 into Equation (6), we obtain the following:
χ (x) |ι=1,γ=0 = F

 ∆
[σs(x)]δ

 . (15)
The sign of Equation (15) is positive because ∆ > 0, σ > 0, and s(x) > 0 for any x ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, the fixed point of Equation (15) is positive, that is, x∗under > 0.
Proposition 3 suggests that some individuals refrain from going out even if they all think that
the probability of infection is zero under the emergency declaration. This suggests that even in the
absence of the fear of infection, non-legally binding emergency declarations can influence behavior
through stigmatization.
This section describes the theoretical analysis of individual behavior in situations where there is
an infection risk and psychological cost due to the stigma of going out. We show that requests for self-
restraint against going out based on non-legally binding emergency declarations are in effect in an
equilibrium. Notably, Proposition 3 suggests that non-legally binding emergency declarations also
affect the behavior of players through stigmatization even in the condition with a fixed subjective
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probability of infection. In the following empirical analysis, we examine the results of Proposition
22.
2.2 Comparative Static Analysis
To investigate the effects of a change in each parameter (uout, uhome, γ, c, σ, and δ) on the equi-
librium proportion of players going out, we conduct a comparative static analysis. Results are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Results in the comparative static analysis are given as follows:
1. An increase in the utility from going out raises the population of players going out in the
equilibrium under the state of emergency and after its lifting.
2. An increase in the utility from staying home reduces the population of players going out in the
equilibrium under the state of emergency and after its lifting.
3. An increase in the subjective probability of an individual being infected after going out reduces
the population of players going out in the equilibrium under the state of emergency and after
its lifting.
4. An increase in the cost of infection reduces the population of players going out in the equilib-
rium under the state of emergency and after its lifting.
5. An increase in the relative size of the stigma to the infection in the psychological cost reduces
the population of players going out in the equilibrium under the state of emergency whereas it
does not affect it after the lifting.
6. An increase in the level of the parameter of cost to scale reduces the population of players
going out in the equilibrium under the state of emergency and after its lifting.
Proof. First, we conduct the comparative static analysis in the equilibrium under the state of
emergency. Let us consider the effect of an increase in the level of the utility from going out, uout,
2Proposition 3 analyzes going-out behavior under the subjective infection probability of zero. However, because it
is difficult to verify a situation wherein the subjective infection probability is zero in the real world, only Proposition
2 is tested in the empirical analysis.
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on the equilibrium under the state of emergency, x∗under. By the implicit function theorem, we get
the following result:
dx∗under
duout
=
∂χ(x)|ι=1
∂uout
1− ∂χ(x)|ι=1
∂x
, (16)
because:
∂χ (x) |ι=1
∂uout
= f

 ∆
[γc+ σs(x)]δ

 > 0, (17)
and ∂χ (x) |ι=1/∂x < 1 from the stability condition.
The effect of an increase in the level of the utility from staying home, uhome, on the equilibrium
under the state of emergency, x∗under, is given by:
dx∗under
duhome
=
∂χ(x)|ι=1
∂uhome
1− ∂χ(x)|ι=1
∂x
< 0, (18)
because:
∂χ (x) |ι=1
∂uhome
= −f

 ∆
[γc+ σs(x)]δ

 < 0. (19)
The effect of an increase in the subjective probability of an individual being infected after going
out, γ, on the equilibrium under the state of emergency, x∗under, is given by:
dx∗under
dγ
=
∂χ(x)|ι=1
∂γ
1− ∂χ(x)|ι=1
∂x
< 0, (20)
because:
∂χ (x) |ι=1
∂γ
= f
(
∆
[γc+ ισs(x)]δ
)(
−
∆δc
[γc+ σs(x)]δ+1
)
< 0. (21)
The effect of an increase in the cost of infection, c, on the equilibrium under the state of
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emergency, x∗under, is given by:
dx∗under
dc
=
∂χ(x)|ι=1
∂c
1− ∂χ(x)|ι=1
∂x
< 0, (22)
because:
∂χ (x) |ι=1
∂c
= f
(
∆
[γc+ ισs(x)]δ
)(
−
∆δγ
[γc+ σs(x)]δ+1
)
< 0. (23)
The effect of an increase in the relative size of the stigma to the infection in the psychological
cost, σ, on the equilibrium under the state of emergency, x∗under, is given by:
dx∗under
dσ
=
∂χ(x)|ι=1
∂σ
1− ∂χ(x)|ι=1
∂x
< 0, (24)
because:
∂χ (x) |ι=1
∂σ
= f
(
∆
[γc+ ισs(x)]δ
)(
−
∆δs(x)
[γc+ σs(x)]δ+1
)
< 0 (25)
The effect of an increase in the level of the parameter of cost to scale, δ, on the equilibrium
under the state of emergency, x∗under, is given by:
dx∗under
dδ
=
∂χ(x)|ι=1
∂δ
1− ∂χ(x)|ι=1
∂x
< 0, (26)
because:
∂χ (x) |ι=1
∂δ
= f
(
∆
[γc+ ισs(x)]δ
)(
−
∆δ(γc+σs(x)) ln δ
[γc+ ισs(x)]2δ
)
< 0. (27)
Next, we conduct the comparative static analysis in the equilibrium after the state of emergency
is lifted. Let us consider the effect of an increase in the level of the utility of going out, uout, on the
equilibrium after the state of emergency is lifted, x∗post. The result is given by:
dx∗post
duout
= f
(
∆
(γc)δ
)
> 0. (28)
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The effect of an increase in the level of the utility of staying home, uhome, on the equilibrium
after the state of emergency is lifted, x∗post, is given by:
dx∗post
duhome
= −f
(
∆
(γc)δ
)
< 0. (29)
The effect of an increase in the subjective probability of an individual being infected after going
out, γ, on the equilibrium after the state of emergency is lifted, x∗post, is given by:
dx∗post
dγ
= f
(
∆
(γc)δ
)[
−
∆δc
(γc)δ+1
]
< 0. (30)
The effect of an increase in the cost of infection, c, on the equilibrium after the state of emergency
is lifted, x∗post, is given by:
dx∗post
dc
= f
(
∆
(γc)δ
)[
−
∆δγ
(γc)δ+1
]
< 0. (31)
The effect of the relative size of the stigma to the infection in the psychological cost, σ, on the
equilibrium after the state of emergency is lifted, x∗post, is zero because
dx∗post
dσ
= 0. (32)
The effect of an increase in the parameter of cost to scale, δ, on the equilibrium after the state
of emergency is lifted, x∗post, is given by:
dx∗post
dδ
= f
(
∆
(γc)δ
)[
−
∆δ(γc) ln δ
(γc)2δ
]
< 0. (33)
Proposition 4 shows natural results. The effect of an increase in the utility from going out on
the proportion of players is positive in both equilibria x∗under and x
∗
post. This result is because of
the increased incentive to go out. By contrast, the effect of an increase in the utility of staying
home on the proportion of players going out is negative in both equilibria. This result is because
of the decreased incentive to go out. Similarly, the subjective probability of an individual being
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infected after going out, the cost of infection, the relative size of the stigma to the infection in the
psychological cost, and the parameter of cost to scale have negative effects on the proportion of
players going out. However, the relative size of the stigma to the infection in the psychological cost
has no effect on the x∗post because there is no stigma in the equilibrium.
3 Empirical Analysis
This section analyzes how Japan’s unenforceable emergency declarations triggered by COVID-19
affected people’s going-out behavior using daily prefectural population flow data from the Google
COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports as well as several covariates. In addition, we analyze how
the behavior of people who went out after the state of emergency was lifted changed compared
with that before it was issued, that is, whether the effects of the declaration continued after the
emergency was lifted.
3.1 Methodology
In this study, we analyze the effects of emergency declarations on people’s going-out behavior using
a panel data model. Specifically, the following one-way error component model (Baltagi, 1984) is
used:
yit = x
′
itβ + eit,
eit = αi + νit, (34)
where y is the dependent variable of human flow, i = 1, . . . , n is the index for the ith prefec-
ture, t = 1, . . . , T is the date, x is an explanatory variable vector containing covariates, β is an
unknown parameter vector, and e is the disturbance term. Furthermore, as in Equation 34, the
disturbance term can be decomposed into stochastic variability ν and prefecture-level heterogeneity
α. Furthermore, focusing on the explanatory variable vector, it is decomposed as follows:
xit :=
[
d′it,w
′
it
]′
, (35)
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where dit is a vector of target variables consisting of two dummy variables, one for the date under
the declaration and one for the date after the declaration, and wit is a covariate vector.
The model in Equation (34) can be estimated using a one-way fixed-effect estimator (hereinafter,
one-way FE) and a one-way random-effect estimator (hereinafter, one-way RE). The one-way FE
presumes a binary dummy variable for αi, whereas the one-way RE assumes that the individual
effect is randomly determined. In this study, we estimate both and examine the estimates adopted
as a result of the Hausman test.
3.2 Data
This study measures the effect of unenforceable emergency declarations on people’s going-out be-
havior in Japan. For this purpose, we constructed a daily panel dataset at the prefecture level. In
this section, we describe the contents of the data in detail.
First, we discuss the dependent variable yit described in Section 3.1, namely, going-out behavior,
which is the subject of the effects of policy interventions. This study uses the Google COVID-19
Community Mobility Reports3 to evaluate the effect of the data on people’s going-out behavior
across Japan. Google collected these data to provide evidence on how public health authorities
respond to COVID-19. These data are anonymized and aggregated with an emphasis on protecting
people’s privacy by using only location information from applications such as Google Maps4; in
other words, the data are summarized by region. In Japan, approximately 90% of people have
used map applications at least once, and the number of Google Maps users is approximately 80%
based on a survey5. Therefore, anonymized aggregate data obtained from users’ Google Maps
location data are considered reliable in terms of representing human flows in all prefectures of
Japan. In addition, these data are divided into six categories according to the content of the
going-out behavior: “Retail & recreation,” “Grocery & pharmacy,” “Parks,” “Transit stations,”
“Workplaces,” and “Residential.” In this study, four of these six categories, “Retail & recreation”
(retail), “Grocery & pharmacy” (grocery), “Parks” (park), and “Workplaces” (workplace), are
used as dependent variables in terms of measuring the effect of emergency declarations based on the
purpose of going out. According to the Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports, retail
3https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/, accessed on July 10, 2020
4https://www.google.co.jp/maps/, accessed on July 10, 2020
5https://www.value-press.com/pressrelease/215276, in Japanese, accessed on July 10, 2020
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refers to going-out behavior consisting of entertainment and leisure-time purchases at restaurants,
cafes, shopping centers, theme parks, museums, libraries, cinemas, and so forth. grocery refers
to going-out behavior for activities related to purchasing daily necessities, such as visiting grocery
stores, food wholesalers, fruit and vegetable markets, luxury grocery stores, drug stores, pharmacies,
and so forth. park refers to going out to a park, such as a regional park, national park, public beach,
marina, dog park, square, garden, and so forth. Finally, workplace refers to going-out behavior
related to workplace commuting. In addition, it is important to note that these movement data
are presented as percentage changes from the baseline value for each of the seven days of the week.
These baseline values are defined by the median value for each of the seven days of the week during
the five-week period from January 3 to February 6, 2020.
Second, we discuss variables that make up the target explanatory variable, dit. This vector
comprises variables that measure the status of the emergency declaration. Therefore, we use the
following variables as target variables in this study: the first is under that equals 1 on dates under
the state of emergency and 0 otherwise, and the second is post that equals 1 on dates after the
state of emergency was lifted and 0 otherwise. The dates on which the state of emergency was
declared and was lifted differ from prefecture to prefecture. In this study, we use date range data
on the emergency declarations in Japan (Katafuchi, 2020) based on reports published by the Office
for Novel Coronavirus Disease Control, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan.
Third, we describe a covariate vector wit. As mentioned earlier, the dependent variable in this
dataset is represented by the disparity from the seven reference values on each day of the week.
Therefore, it is possible that there are seasonal differences between the five weeks within which
these reference values are defined and the sample. In this study, the two weather variables, daily
precipitation (precipitation) and daily sunshine hours (sunlight), are obtained from the Japan
Meteorological Agency6, and are used to control for its seasonality. The positional attributes of these
data are defined by a more detailed classification than at the prefecture level. Therefore, in this
study, we treat meteorological data from the prefectural capitals as prefecture-level meteorological
data to ensure representativeness. Furthermore, we consider that the effect of the spread of COVID-
19, that is, the subjective probability of contracting the disease, on people’s going-out behavior is
present, as also incorporated in the theoretical model in Section 2. Therefore, it is necessary to
6https://www.data.jma.go.jp/obd/stats/etrn/index.php, in Japanese, accessed on July 10, 2020
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control the situation of infection at the prefecture level. This study thus incorporates a one-period
lag of the increase in the number of infected people per million (inc positive perm) into the
covariate vector. These data are calculated using the data from TOYO KEIZAI ONLINE (2020).
However, because the data period begins from March 11, 2020, the data before that date were
compiled based on press releases by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Japan7.
Finally, we discuss how we determined the sample period for this dataset. Table 1 shows when the
state of emergency was declared (emergency start) and lifted (emergency end) for each prefecture,
as well as the period during which the state of emergency was declared (emergency length). The
length of time under the emergency declaration varied from prefecture to prefecture—the shortest
period was 28 days in approximately 80% of the prefectures. In this study, we use the mode value
of the period under the emergency declaration to determine the length of the sample period under
the state of emergency and after its lifting. Accordingly, this length is determined from the issuance
to the cancellation of the state of emergency in large urban areas, such as Tokyo, Kanagawa, and
Osaka, as these areas had longer emergency periods than most other regions. Therefore, we define
the sample period from April 7 to 28 days prior to the declaration of the state of emergency in
these metropolitan areas—that is, March 10, 2020, is the starting point of the entire sample period.
Conversely, this study defines the sample period from May 25 to 28 days after the lifting of the
state of emergency for these metropolitan areas as the post-declaration sample period, with June
22, 2020 as the endpoint of the overall sample period. The sample is therefore composed of 47
prefectures, that is, n = 47; the sample period is from March 10 to June 22, 2020, that is, T = 105;
and the sample size is N = nT = 47× 105 = 4, 935.
3.3 Result
First, we briefly look at the disparity between the going-out behavior in the pre-declaration, under
declaration, and post-declaration periods. It must be noted that each of these disparities is defined
by the difference from the representative value for the reference period defined by the Google
COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports. Figure 2 shows the disparity for retail, that is, the
difference from the reference value for the going-out purpose of purchasing activities related to
7https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/0000121431_00086.html, in Japanese, accessed on July
10, 2020
entertainment and leisure, for the time period specified by the declaration of the state of emergency.
To show the disparity more clearly by day of the week in this figure, we choose representative dates
for each day of the week for each time period defined by the emergency declaration, so that the
status of the emergency declaration is the same for all prefectures: March 28 (Saturday), March 29
(Sunday), and April 1 (Wednesday) for pre-declaration; April 25 (Saturday), April 26 (Sunday), and
April 29 (Wednesday) for under declaration; and May 30 (Saturday), May 31 (Sunday), and June
3 (Wednesday) for post-declaration. To further reflect the status of infection in each prefecture,
this figure groups the samples by the date of the end of the state of emergency and shows the
different shapes of the points. The three panels on the left compare the going-out behavior for
retail between flows before and under the emergency declaration, and the three panels on the
right compare the flows for retail under the emergency and after it was lifted. The overall trend
is that there is a bigger flow of people pre- and post-declaration than under declaration. In other
words, the flow of people for retail under a declared state of emergency decreases. This is because
almost all of the points are to the left of the 45-degree line. However, a comparison between Sundays
before and under the emergency declaration shows a slight increase in flows under the emergency
declaration in some large cities such as Tokyo and Kanagawa in prefectures where the declaration
was lifted the latest.
Next, we look briefly at the disparity in human flows for grocery. Figure 3 shows the same
overall trend as for retail, although the number of prefectures where the flow of people is higher
in the under declaration than in the pre-declaration is higher here. As for parks, except for the
Saturday after lifting the state of emergency and the Sunday before its lifting, the overall increase
in the number of people going to parks under the emergency declaration can be seen in Figure 4.
Finally, for workplace, the trend is the same as for retail and grocery. Figure 5 shows that the
number of people going out for work decreased on any day of the week under a declared emergency
situation. This can be attributed to the people’s semi-compulsory decision of not going out for work
in response to the government’s telecommute requirements. With the exception of park, the going-
out behavior in all categories decreased under the declaration. However, an analysis controlling
for seasonality is necessary for park; furthermore, this analysis fails to account for prefecture-level
heterogeneity in going-out behavior. In this study, we estimate the panel data model described in
Section 3.1 and conduct in-depth analysis of how non-legally binding emergency declarations can
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Figure 2: Comparison of going-out behavior in Japan’s prefectures: retail
Notes: The panels show the scatter plots of going-out behavior for retail between
pre-declaration and under declaration (left) and post-declaration and under declaration (right) for
three representative days: Saturday, Sunday, and Wednesday.
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affect going-out behavior.
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Figure 3: Comparison of going-out behavior in Japan’s prefectures: grocery
Notes: The panels show the scatter plots of going-out behavior for grocery between
pre-declaration and under declaration (left) and post-declaration and under declaration (right) for
three representative days: Saturday, Sunday, and Wednesday.
Table 2 shows the results of estimating the panel data model introduced in Section 3.1 with
the prefecture-level panel dataset created in this study. Each column represents a category of the
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Figure 4: Comparison of going-out behavior in Japan’s prefectures: park
Notes: The panels show the scatter plots of going-out behavior for park between pre-declaration
and under declaration (left) and post-declaration and under declaration (right) for three
representative days: Saturday, Sunday, and Wednesday.
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Figure 5: Comparison of going-out behavior in the prefectures of Japan: workplace
Notes: The panels show the scatter plots of going-out behavior for workplace between
pre-declaration and under declaration (left) and post-declaration and under declaration (right) for
three representative days: Saturday, Sunday, and Wednesday.
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dependent variable, the change in going-out behavior from the reference going out period. Fol-
lowing the rule that a fixed-effect estimator is used if the results of the Hausman test are less
than 5% statistically significant, a one-way fixed effect estimator is used in all categories except for
park. This may be explained by the fact that heterogeneity at the prefectural level is randomly
determined with respect to the going-out behavior for park, as seen in the scatter-plot analysis de-
scribed above. The estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant for all dependent
variables, both under and post. Therefore, the results show that, comparing the periods before
the emergency declaration and the reference value, going-out behavior decreased in both the under
declaration and post-declaration periods. Furthermore, looking at the estimated magnitudes of the
coefficients, under is smaller than post for all dependent variables. This phenomenon suggests
that under the state of emergency declaration, people may have been less likely to go out than
post-declaration, based on the difference between their behaviors and the reference value before the
emergency declaration.
To confirm the robustness of this relationship, this study conducts sensitivity analyses. First,
results of the estimation with all covariates excluded are shown in Table 3. In this simpler estimation
model, a one-way random effect estimator is used in the models for the three dependent variables
except for workplace, following the rule that a fixed-effect estimator is used if the results of the
Hausman test show that the statistical significance is less than 5%. Therefore, it is desirable that
heterogeneity at the prefectural level is randomly determined when no covariates are incorporated
into the model. The estimation results, however, show the same tendency as in Table 2, which
presents the estimation result with all covariates. Second, the results of the estimation using
estimators, which are not adopted based on the rule of using a fixed-effect estimator if the results
of the Hausman test showed less than 5% statistical significance, are shown in Table 4 when all
covariates are included and in Table 5 when all covariates are excluded. In these results, the
coefficients are similar to those in Tables 2 and 3, that is, fewer individuals going out in the under
and post declaration periods than before the declaration of the state of emergency. Moreover, the
most self-restraint was shown under the declaration of the state of emergency. Third, Tables 6
and 7 show the results of each estimation in a sample of 47 prefectures divided into two subsets:
one (N = nT = 7 × 105 = 735) consisting of the seven prefectures where a state of emergency
was declared the earliest on April 7, 2020 (Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Osaka, Hyogo, and
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Fukuoka), as shown in Table 1, and the other (N = nT = 40 × 105 = 4, 200) consisting of the
remaining 40 prefectures where the state of emergency was not issued on this date. The estimators
used are based on the rule that a fixed-effect estimator is used if the results of the Hausman test show
that the statistical significance is less than 5%. These results reinforce the findings that for both
the seven prefectures with the earliest emergency declaration and the other 40 prefectures, there
was less going-out behavior under and post declaration than before the declaration. Moreover, the
most significant self-restraint behavior was observed under the declaration, except for the estimated
result for the seven prefectures that there was less going-out behavior for park after the emergency
was lifted than under the declaration. These sensitivity analyses indicate that the phenomenon of
a statistically significant negative coefficient for under and post and a smaller coefficient for under
than for post is robust.
This section confirmed the following: Going-out behavior was reduced both under the emergency
declaration and after the emergency was lifted compared with before the declaration of the state of
emergency; in addition, going-out behavior was most suppressed under the emergency declaration.
This result clarifies two findings: First, people refrained from going out both under the declaration
and after the lifting of the state of emergency. Second, despite the non-legally binding emergency
declarations, people were more likely to refrain from going out under the declaration of a state
of emergency than after it was lifted. Therefore, this second finding in the empirical analysis is
consistent with Proposition 2 of the theoretical analysis in Section 2. This suggests that under a
declared state of emergency, people may have acted because of the stigma of going out as well as
the risk of infection.
4 Conclusion
This study analyzes the effects of non-legally binding policies on going-out behavior from two
perspectives: the construction of a micro-theoretical model and an empirical analysis using panel
data from the Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports.
A plausible reason for the declaration’s effectiveness is that people considered the risk of infection
to be high. If this were the only reason, then the effect of restraint should be consistent when the risk
of infection is constant under the declaration of an emergency and after it is lifted. The theoretical
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analysis of this study assumes that under a declared state of emergency, an individual going out
suffers psychological costs arising from both the risk of infection and the stigma of going out. As a
result, we showed that under a declared state of emergency, going out entails a strong psychological
cost and people refrain from it (Proposition 2).
Using a panel dataset consisting of date data on the Japanese emergency declaration and daily
human flow data as well as various covariates from Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports,
the empirical analysis revealed two points. First, the flow of people under the declaration of a state
of emergency was suppressed. Second, although the effect of the restraint continued after the state
of emergency was lifted, the degree of restraint was greater under the state of emergency.
As the number of infected people in Japan is increasing again, there is a possibility that another
state of emergency will be declared. In terms of policy action in such circumstances, the results of
this study provide one policy implication by highlighting that non-legally binding policies can be
effective in terms of reducing the number of people infected, that is, by curtailing their going-out
behavior.
This study suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria—a strictly self-restraint equilibrium
and not-strictly self-restraint equilibrium. In both equilibria, declaring a state of emergency has the
effect of reducing the number of people going out, but the degree of effect may vary significantly. If
there are multiple equilibria, then while the strictly self-restraint equilibrium was realized in Japan
in reality, the not-strictly self-restraint equilibrium could also have been realized.
Hence, there is no guarantee that the effect of an emergency declaration will always be the same
because it is generally not possible to know a priori which equilibrium will actually be realized as in
the game with multiple equilibria. Therefore, it is likely that non-legally binding policies would need
to be revised in favor of more legally binding policies to achieve a more accurate policy outcome in
the fight against COVID-19.
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Table 1: Date and length of state of emergency in the prefectures of Japan
prefecture emergency start emergency end emergency length
Hokkaido 2020-04-16 2020-05-25 39
Aomori 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Iwate 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Miyagi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Akita 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Yamagata 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Fukushima 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Ibaraki 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Tochigi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Gunma 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Saitama 2020-04-07 2020-05-25 48
Chiba 2020-04-07 2020-05-25 48
Tokyo 2020-04-07 2020-05-25 48
Kanagawa 2020-04-07 2020-05-25 48
Niigata 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Toyama 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Ishikawa 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Fukui 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Yamanashi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Nagano 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Gifu 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Shizuoka 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Aichi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Mie 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Shiga 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Kyoto 2020-04-16 2020-05-21 35
Osaka 2020-04-07 2020-05-21 44
Hyogo 2020-04-07 2020-05-21 44
Nara 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Wakayama 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Tottori 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Shimane 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Okayama 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Hiroshima 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Yamaguchi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Tokushima 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Kagawa 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Ehime 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Kochi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Fukuoka 2020-04-07 2020-05-14 37
Saga 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Nagasaki 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Kumamoto 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Oita 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Miyazaki 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Kagoshima 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Okinawa 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
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Table 2: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data
Dependent variable
retail grocery park workplace
under −19.955∗∗∗ −5.578∗∗∗ −12.884∗∗∗ −18.182∗∗∗
(0.513) (0.235) (1.544) (0.507)
post −6.410∗∗∗ −2.159∗∗∗ −7.231∗∗∗ −3.340∗∗∗
(0.387) (0.199) (1.770) (0.325)
Constant −6.067∗∗∗
(1.296)
Observations 4,935 4,935 4,935 4,935
R2 0.588 0.488 0.533 0.335
Adjusted R2 0.583 0.483 0.532 0.328
Hausman-test 1513.3∗∗∗ 73.443∗∗∗ 3.393 114.81∗∗∗
Estimator FE FE RE FE
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect; RE=random
effect.
Table 3: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data: sensitivity analysis without covariates
Dependent variable:
retail grocery park workplace
under −20.143∗∗∗ −5.288∗∗∗ −10.972∗∗∗ −18.142∗∗∗
(0.640) (0.245) (1.460) (0.526)
post −5.925∗∗∗ −2.600∗∗∗ −9.664∗∗∗ −3.368∗∗∗
(0.391) (0.215) (2.071) (0.311)
Constant −7.482∗∗∗ 3.005∗∗∗ 8.421∗∗∗
(0.546) (0.240) (1.231)
Observations 4,935 4,935 4,935 4,935
R2 0.492 0.177 0.045 0.334
Adjusted R2 0.492 0.177 0.045 0.327
Hausman-test 4.586 0.093 0.045 21.868∗∗∗
Estimator RE RE RE FE
Covariates No No No No
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect; RE=random
effect.
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Table 4: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data: sensitivity analysis using other estimators
with covariates
Dependent variable:
retail grocery park workplace
under −19.991∗∗∗ −5.577∗∗∗ −12.891∗∗∗ −18.305∗∗∗
(0.519) (0.236) (1.545) (0.525)
post −6.446∗∗∗ −2.162∗∗∗ −7.232∗∗∗ −3.452∗∗∗
(0.392) (0.199) (1.773) (0.347)
Constant −8.138∗∗∗ 1.685∗∗∗ −7.925∗∗∗
(0.545) (0.281) (0.354)
Observations 4,935 4,935 4,935 4,935
R2 0.585 0.486 0.536 0.336
Adjusted R2 0.585 0.485 0.531 0.335
Hausman-test 1513.3∗∗∗ 73.443∗∗∗ 3.393 114.81∗∗∗
Estimator RE RE FE RE
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect; RE=random
effect.
Table 5: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data: sensitivity analysis using other estimators
without covariates
Dependent variable:
retail grocery park workplace
under −20.101∗∗∗ −5.286∗∗∗ −10.977∗∗∗ −18.272∗∗∗
(0.630) (0.245) (1.464) (0.555)
post −5.926∗∗∗ −2.600∗∗∗ −9.665∗∗∗ −3.364∗∗∗
(0.390) (0.215) (2.070) (0.310)
Constant −7.572∗∗∗
(0.300)
Observations 4,935 4,935 4,935 4,935
R2 0.495 0.178 0.046 0.334
Adjusted R2 0.490 0.170 0.036 0.333
Hausman-test 4.586 0.093 0.045 21.868∗∗∗
Estimator FE FE FE RE
Covariates No No No No
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect; RE=random
effect.
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Table 6: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data: sensitivity analysis using a subset of the
sample with the earliest state of emergency declaration
Dependent variable:
retail grocery park workplace
under −25.005∗∗∗ −6.341∗∗∗ −9.888∗∗∗ −23.756∗∗∗
(1.312) (0.588) (1.016) (0.729)
post −10.002∗∗∗ −2.826∗∗∗ −11.053∗∗∗ −7.739∗∗∗
(1.051) (0.590) (0.830) (0.846)
Constant −12.034∗∗∗
(2.199)
Observations 735 735 735 735
R2 0.734 0.627 0.669 0.485
Adjusted R2 0.733 0.621 0.664 0.477
Hausman-test 11.020∗ 34.235∗∗∗ 467.020∗∗∗ 1083.000∗∗∗
Estimator RE FE FE FE
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect; RE=random
effect.
Table 7: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data: sensitivity analysis using a subset of the
sample without the earliest state of emergency declaration
Dependent variable:
retail grocery park workplace
under −19.195∗∗∗ −5.480∗∗∗ −13.666∗∗∗ −17.247∗∗∗
(0.484) (0.263) (1.798) (0.429)
post −5.982∗∗∗ −2.124∗∗∗ −6.863∗∗∗ −2.715∗∗∗
(0.389) (0.213) (2.037) (0.232)
Constant −7.342∗∗∗ −6.383∗∗∗
(0.419) (1.404)
Observations 4,200 4,200 4,200 4,200
R2 0.552 0.487 0.513 0.308
Adjusted R2 0.552 0.481 0.513 0.301
Hausman-test 4.315∗ 29.896∗∗∗ 0.2385 17.459∗∗∗
Estimator RE FE RE FE
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect; RE=random
effect.
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